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Deconstructing Davis v. United States:
Intention and Meaning in Ambiguous
Requests for Counsel
BY DAVID ARAM KAISER* AND PAUL LUFKIN**
Introduction: The Legacy of Deconstruction for Constitutional
Interpretation
Jacques Derrida, the French intellectual known as the father of
"deconstruction" theory, died on October 8, 2004, at age 74, in Paris.
His passing has been the occasion for a reconsideration of the
influence of deconstruction across a wide range of disciplines,
including the law. In the legal world, some have seen the death of
Derrida as an excuse to close the door on any deconstructionist
analysis of the law.' However, many insights on language and
meaning that are associated with deconstruction theory remain
crucial to legal analysis. For interpretation, as with all other things,
ignorance of the past dooms one to relive its errors. A case in point is
the United States Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. United States.2
As we shall demonstrate, the holding in Davis - that courts must
* David Aram Kaiser, J.D., is a 2001 graduate of University of California, Hastings
College of the Law. He previously received a Ph.D. in English from the University of
California at Berkeley. Presently a Legal Research Attorney for the Superior Court of
Alameda County in Oakland, California, Mr. Kaiser is the author of a legal Note, United
States v. Coon: The End of Detrimental Reliance in Plea Agreements? (52 HASTINGS L.
J., 579-601, January 2001) and an academic book, ROMANTICISM, AESTHETICS, AND
NATIONALISM (Cambridge University Press, 1999).
** Paul Lufkin, J.D., is a judicial staff attorney at the Supreme Court of California.
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Refugee Law Center in Boston, Massachusetts, and author of several articles on topics
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1. See, e.g., Justin Scheck, Deconstruction Bar Finds Meaning in Derrida's Death,
SAN FRANCISCO RECORDER, October 18, 2004, at p. 4.
2. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
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determine whether a suspect has "articulate[d] his desire to have
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in
the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for
an attorney, 3 - depends on conceptions of language and meaning
that deconstruction theory has discredited.
Section 1: Derrida's Deconstruction of Literal Meaning
One problem with describing the influence of deconstruction
theory in the United States is that the term deconstruction has meant
many, and sometimes contradictory, things to different people.
Certainly, deconstruction is associated with the work of Jacques
Derrida.4 The full legacy of deconstruction resides, however, not only
in the works of Derrida but also in the large body of ideas and
writings created in response to those works. Derrida and
deconstruction became a sounding board against which scholars
across a wide range of academic disciplines engaged in important
theoretical debates on the nature of philosophy, society, and
language. One particular subsection of these debates has centered on
the relationship between language and meaning. Controversy on this
topic arose, initially, within the greater academic world of literary
theory, but ultimately spread to several other disciplines, including
the law, where it became part of a larger debate - sometimes
referred to as the "culture wars" - in which some commentators
complained that certain theoretical movements, including and
especially deconstruction, were undermining traditional Western
values
Derrida's influence on literary theory began with his
participation in the Structuralist Conference at Johns Hopkins
University in 1966. Structuralism was a movement associated with
the French anthropologist Claude L6vi-Strauss. L6vi-Strauss and his
movement had attempted to describe cultural constructions, such as
3. Id. at 459.
4. See JACQUES DERRIDA, Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences, in THE STRUCTURALIST CONTROVERSY (Richard Macksey & Eugenio Donato
eds., Johns Hopkins Univ. Press 1976).
5. See, e.g., ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: How
HIGHER EDUCATION HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF
TODAY'S STUDENTS 379 (Simon & Schuster, 1987); ("[Deconstructionism] is the last,
predictable, stage in the suppression of reason and the denial of the possibility of truth in
the name of philosophy. The interpreter's creative activity is more important than the
text; there is no text, only interpretation;"); see also DAVID LEHMAN, SIGNS OF THE
TIMES: DECONSTRUCTION AND THE FALL OF PAUL DE MAN (Poisedon Press 1991).
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the myths of aboriginal peoples, as systems of terms within a
structure.6 Ldvi-Strauss, in turn, had been influenced by the work of
certain linguists, in particular Ferdinand Saussure, who had described
language as a formal structure of elements (i.e., words and
grammatical rules) existing apart from the particular spoken
utterances of individual speakers.7 Structuralism's emphasis on the
formal structures of language can be seen as an attempt to obtain
scientific rigor through an objective method for the interpretation of
language.8  As will be discussed below, the Davis Court, in
propounding its standard for interpreting a suspect's invocation of the
right to counsel, expressed a similar sort of desire to reach an
"objective" method of interpretation.
Derrida criticized structuralism for failing to appreciate how the
very nature of language defeats any attempt to define linguistic
utterances as formal structures. In particular, Derrida pointed to one
essential quality of language being its "iterability" - i.e., the
availability of its components for repetition - which, he argued,
confounded structuralism's and other theoretical attempts to define a
closed system of language. In this vein, Derrida stated:
The iterability of the mark does not leave any of the
philosophical oppositions which govern the idealizing
abstraction intact (for instance, serious/non-serious,
literal/metaphorical or sarcastic, ordinary/parasitical, strict/non-
strict, etc.). Iterability blurs a priori the dividing-line that
passes between these opposed terms, "corrupting" it if you like,
contaminating it parasitically, qua limit.9
By "iterability," Derrida meant that the essence of any word is
that it will be repeated, that is, used to produce meaning time and
time again in different situations. This was not a new idea. In fact,
the concept of the "iterability" of language lay at the basis of
structuralism, in its principle that languages are closed systems
because there exists at any given moment only a finite set of words
within a given language. Consequently, any given word must be
capable of being used over and over again - repeated, iterated - in
6. See CLAUDE LtvI-STRAUSS, STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY (Claire Jacobson
& Brooke Schoepf trans., Basic Books 1963).
7. This is the basis for Saussure's famous distinction between lange and parole. See
FERDINAND DE SAUSSURE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Wade Baskin trans.,
McGraw-Hill 1966).
8. See ROBERT CON DAVIS & RONALD SCHLEIFER, CONTEMPORARY LITERARY
CRITICISM: LITERARY & CULTURAL STUDIES 233-41 (Longman 3d ed. 1994).
9. JACQUES DERRIDA, LIMITED INC. 123 (Northwestern Univ. Press 1988).
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an unforeseen (and unforeseeable) number of possible situations.
Derrida pointed out that the quality of inherent iterability suggests
that no word or phrase can be assumed to retain a constant meaning
across all instances of its use. Rather, when a word or phrase is
spoken or written in different contexts, it will necessarily assume
different meanings.
One of the most familiar instances of words' variable meaning
lies in the common distinction between the "literal" use of a word or
phrase, and a "figurative" use of the same word or phrase - for
example, as sarcasm. Thus the single phrase, "That's just great," can
have very different meanings depending on the context surrounding
its utterance and the intention of the speaker. If a law student utters
this phrase immediately after she has learned she has passed the bar
examination, a hearer would intelligently assume she intends it to
have its "literal" meaning. However, if she utters the identical phrase
immediately after observing that a parking ticket has been placed on
the windshield of her car, a hearer would properly interpret her
meaning as sarcasm. The latter hearer would, in fact, most
reasonably conclude that the law student actually meant
(sarcastically) to convey a meaning that is the reverse of the phrase's
literal meaning.
Using even such a simple example as this, one can generate an
almost limitless number of contextual variations that might throw into
question a hearer's ability to judge accurately whether a phrase is
being used literally or sarcastically. For example, suppose that prior
to learning that she had passed the bar examination, our hypothetical
law student had been expressing her ambivalence about the legal
profession generally - stating that she actually hoped she would fail
the examination so she would not have to undertake the labor of
building a new lawyer's career. In such a context, we might also
interpret her statement, "That's just great," even when uttered upon
her learning she had passed the bar examination, as being uttered
sarcastically and, hence, having a non-literal meaning.
Partly by using such examples, Derrida focused on the
uncertainty of any text's meaning in order to demonstrate that one
may not take for granted, as many theorists had, traditional categories
of meaning such as "literal" versus "figurative." Derrida persistently
sought to "deconstruct" such oppositions through rigorous reading of
philosophic and literary texts. Because of his emphasis on
deconstructing these traditional oppositions, many understood
Derrida to be arguing that traditional categories of interpretation (for
example, the category of literal versus figurative) do not exist in
[Vol. 32:3
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reality and, consequently, that language is without meaning. Certainly
this was the way Derrida was understood by many of his critics.1°
A somewhat more temperate, and sympathetic, interpretation of
Derrida's work is available, however. Some have taken as
deconstruction's central insight, not that traditional oppositions in the
understanding of language are meaningless but, rather, that such
traditional oppositions exist in a fluid relationship to each other -
and that a useful understanding of the subtle and changeable nature
of words' meaning is obscured, rather than assisted, by unexamined
reliance on rigid interpretive dichotomies." From this perspective,
awareness of the iterability of language allows an interpreter to
understand any phrase (no matter how literally one context might
demand that it be taken) as having various meanings, other than its
literal one, in various contexts. Structuralist theorists avoided
acknowledging the potential for various meanings inherent in any
phrase because acknowledging this would complicate, if not
completely frustrate, the structuralist project of articulating a
completely specified, predictive theory of language. Thus, to the
extent that structuralists acknowledged ambiguity as a phenomenon
in language, it was considered a type of flaw or defect, or its use was
limited to non-standard "literary" uses of language. But Derrida's
insight was that, far from being a flaw or a specialized use of
language, the potential for a word to carry various meanings was
fundamental to all language:
Once it is iterable, to be sure, a mark marked with a
supposedly "positive" value ("serious," "literal," etc.) can be
mimed, cited, transformed into an "exercise" or into
"literature," even into a "lie" - that is, it can be made to carry
its other, its "negative" double. But iterability is also, by the
same token, the condition of the values said to be "positive."
The simple fact is that this condition of possibility is
structurally divided or "differing-deferring" [differante].12
Derrida also coined the French word "differante" - a pun on
the similar sounds of the French words for "differing" and
"deferring."13 Through the use of this neologism Derrida sought to
10. See, e.g., John R. Searle, Literary History and its Discontents, 25 NEW LITERARY
HIST. 637 (1994).
11. See JONATHAN CULLER, ON DECONSTRUCTION: THEORY AND CRITICISM
AFTER STRUCTURALISM (Cornell Univ. Press 1982).
12. DERRIDA, supra note 9, at 123.
13. See JACQUES DERRIDA, Differance, in SPEECH AND PHENOMENA, AND OTHER
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indicate that the opposing meanings of a word not only "differ" from
each other, but also that they operate so that, in any given particular
utterance, some possible meanings of a word "defer" to other
possible meanings. But Derrida also argued that the opposing (or
otherwise differing) meanings of a word are never entirely absent, but
merely defer to the dominant meaning for the moment, or in that
context. Thus, Derrida, in often whimsical style, with an emphasis on
puns, expressed the serious insight that it is not always easy to
determine where the line between literal and figurative meaning lies.
Section 2: Intent versus Meaning: the Debate in Modern
Literary Theory
Derrida's work came to prominence in Europe as part of the
ongoing theoretical debates over "structuralism" which, as noted
above, were largely focused on the relationship of philosophical
concepts to linguistics and anthropology. In British and American
universities, however, Derrida's work was taken up primarily in
literature departments. There are a number of possible reasons for
this, but perhaps the most important was that the interpretive issues
Derrida dealt with, like the dichotomy between literal and figurative
language, had long been centrally important to Anglo-American
literary criticism. In particular, a broad literary critical movement
identified as "the New Criticism" had emphasized close textual
"readings" of literary texts to uncover the nuanced meanings and
ambiguities of literary texts.14  Although the tradition of New
Criticism provided a basic framework by which Derrida's ideas could
be assimilated into the work of literature scholars, many proponents
of deconstruction in literature departments presented themselves as
breaking with traditional New Criticism.15 Some such critics argued
that proponents of traditional New Criticism correctly identified
hidden ambiguities in subject texts, but then inaccurately attempted
to "resolve" them into a single "coherent" reading. 6
Deconstructionist critics from this perspective emphasized the
presence of irresolvable ambiguities as reflecting the indeterminate
ESSAYS ON HUSSERL'S THEORY OF SIGNS (David B. Allison trans., Northwestern Univ.
Press 1973).
14. See FRANK LENTRICCHIA, AFTER THE NEW CRITICISM (Univ. of Chi. Press
1980).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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nature of language itself.
17
In reaction to deconstructionist criticism's emphasis on the
radical indeterminacy of meaning, certain literary critics sought to
develop criteria for what was variously called "correct" or "valid" or
"objective" interpretation. Of course, the question of how to
determine a "correct" interpretation has been a perennial issue not
only in literature and philosophy, but in the law as well. One
recurring approach to defining a method of correct interpretation in
all of these fields has been to focus on the "literal" meaning of words.
As already discussed, Derrida relentlessly pointed to the problem of
determining, in any specific case, what the literal meaning of a word
or phrase may be.
Additionally, literary studies and the law differ in their
perspectives on linguistic ambiguity. Ambiguity has generally been
regarded in the law - as reflected most strongly in the areas of
contractual and statutory law - largely as a technical problem to be
solved by careful drafting. But in literary studies, because of the
pervasive influence of New Criticism, by the 1960's, even conservative
literary critics acknowledged, and even celebrated, the use of
figurative and ambiguous language. Thus, for a literary critic who
wanted to present an acceptable method for determining a "correct"
or "valid" interpretation, it simply was not fruitful to renounce
linguistic ambiguity in favor of literal meaning. Literary scholars and
critics were driven, instead, to elaborate methods of interpretation
that took ambiguity into account, yet offered criteria for arguing the
validity of particular interpretations against competing ones. The
issue of valid interpretation took on increased importance in the
aftermath of deconstructionist theory, partly because some
deconstructionist critics appeared to take the position that all
language, literary and non-literary alike, was, in the end, hopelessly
indeterminate.
If one accepts that a particular phrase can have several possible
meanings, then one solution to the problem of determining which
meaning is the "correct" one is to identify the speaker's or writer's
apparent intention. This was the approach of the literary theorist
E.D. Hirsch in his aptly titled book, Validity in Interpretation.'8
Hirsch argued that the meaning of a text "is, and can be, nothing
17. Id. Polemics aside, arguably some "traditional" New Critics, like William
Empson in The Seven Types of Ambiguity, offered readings of literary works that were just
as "radical" in their exploration of indeterminate meaning.
18. E. D. HIRSCH, JR., VALIDITY IN INTERPRETATION (1967).
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other than the author's meaning," and "is determined once and for all
by the character of the speaker's intention."' 9 Hirsch also argued that
valid literary interpretation "must stress a reconstruction of the
author's aims and attitudes in order to evolve guides and norms for
construing the meaning of his text."20 In particular, Hirsch contended,
literary critics should use historical and bibliographical information in
order to understand an author's meaning, and not limit themselves
just to generating possible understandings from the various possible
meanings of a text's words themselves.2' Possible meanings of words
are defined, in such an approach, by "public norms" - that is, words
have agreed-upon meanings as indicated by, among other things,
definitions appearing in dictionaries that are generally considered
authoritative.22
As Hirsch elaborated, "no mere sequence of words can represent
an actual verbal meaning with reference to public norms alone.
Referred to those alone, the text's meaning remains indeterminate.
2 3
As an example, Hirsch gives the sentence: "My car ran out of gas."
While this sentence is instantly recognizable to us in its usual,
"literal," meaning, Hirsch argued that, considered as a string of
words, the sentence is susceptible to a number of possible
interpretations. The usual meaning is, of course, my automobile ran
out of fuel. But consider that the same phrase can have the possible
meaning: my Pullman railroad car dashed out from a cloud of Argon
gas. Given the availability of more than one possible meaning, we
might ask, what inclines us, ordinarily, to understand the phrase as
having its usual, "literal," meaning? According to Hirsch, our
tendency to assign a given text its usual or literal meaning arises from
our understanding of the intentions of the speaker who uttered it.
The public norms governing the words alone, that is, do not
determine what we take as the "correct" interpretation. Each of the
19. Id. at 216, 219.
20. Id. at 219.
21. Id. at 224.
22. But it is essential to remember that dictionaries do not even purport to be
independent determiners of meaning in particular contexts. Dictionaries contain after-
the-fact descriptions of existing meanings of words and can at most present sets of possible
meanings; they cannot conclusively determine the meaning conveyed by a word's use in a
particular context. Dictionaries also are, necessarily, incomplete; new meanings of
existing words are constantly developing, which is why dictionaries are regularly revised.
Such fundamental points often seem lost on courts that turn to dictionaries for the
"objective" meaning of words.
23. HIRSCH, supra note 18, at 225.
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words composing our sample text stating that a car ran out of gas, for
example, has at least two alternative public (i.e., dictionary)
meanings. If you look up the word "car" in a complete dictionary,
you will find as possible meanings, both automobile and railroad car.
If you look up the words "ran out of" you will find both "became
empty of" and "dashed from within." If you look up the word "gas,"
you find both "gasoline" and "elemental gases like Argon." Hirsh
argued that what allows us to have confidence that the first
interpretation of the sentence is the correct one is our understanding
of the speaker's intention in uttering the sentence. Our
understanding of that intention, Hirsch argued, will determine our
understanding of the context in which the sentence is spoken. Hirsch
sums up: "The array of possibilities only begins to become a more
selective system of probabilities when, instead of confronting a mere
word sequence, we also posit a speaker who very likely means
something.
24
Hirsch's exhortations that literary critics examine authors'
intentions in settling upon valid interpretations actually were made
prior to deconstruction, and at the time were directed against what
Hirsch complained were the unhistorical readings of certain New
Critics who examined only possible meanings of texts themselves, and
refused to consider historical and bibliographical information in
arriving at their interpretations.2 Hirsch's intentionalist arguments,
however, were brought back into prominence in the era of
deconstructionist criticism by Steven Knapp and Walter Benn
Michaels, two literary theorists who argued that Hirsch had not gone
far enough in insisting on the inseparability of a text's meaning and
the speaker's intention.
Knapp and Michaels argued that, for an interpreter, the very act of
finding any meaning in a sentence presupposes hypothesizing that
sentence as the intention of some speaker or writer: "For a sentence
like 'My car ran out of gas' even to be recognizable as a sentence, we
must already have posited a speaker and hence an intention.,
26
Expanding on the question of the choice between two possible
meanings of Hirsch's hypothetical sentence, Knapp and Michaels posit:
24. Id.
25. See E.D. Hirsch, Against Theory? in W.J.T. MITCHELL, AGAINST THEORY:
LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM (Univ. of Chi. Press 1985), pp. 48-52, at
p. 51.
26. See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Against Theory? in W.J.T.
MITCHELL, AGAINST THEORY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE NEW PRAGMATISM (Univ.
of Chi. Press 1985), pp. 11-30, at p. 14.
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Pinning down an interpretation of the sentence will not involve
adding a speaker but deciding among a range of possible
speakers. Knowing that the speaker inhabits a planet with an
atmosphere of inert gases and on which the primary means of
transportation is by railroad will give one interpretation;
knowing that the speaker is an earthling who owns a Ford will
give another. But even if we have none of this information, as
soon as we attempt to interpret at all we are already committed
to a characterization of the speaker as a speaker of language.
We know, in other words, that the speaker intends to speak;
otherwise we wouldn't be interpreting.
Thus, Knapp and Michaels insisted that what is commonly
thought of as the "literal" interpretation of a sentence comes, not just
from the words on the page, but, rather, always involves an implicit
hypothesis on the part of the interpreter about the speaker's
circumstances and intention. That we do this as interpreters is easy to
see in the case of unusual applications of commonplace phrases, like
Hirsch's example of "My car ran out of gas." In order to see how the
phrase, "My car ran out of gas," could possibly mean "my Pullman
car dashed out of the Argon," for example, an interpreter has to
supply a highly unusual background situation in which the
hypothetical speaker lives and then understand the speaker's
intention to communicate something in relation to that background
situation. But Knapp and Michael's point is that, as interpreters, we
always engage in this basic process of constructing implied context
and speaker intention when we grasp the meaning of a sentence, even
when we think we are merely grasping the "literal" meaning of a
sentence. Thus, even when we understand, "My car ran out of gas,"
in its "literal" sense, we have no less implicitly placed the statement
within a context and posited the speaker's intention (in this case, our
usual world of the internal combustion engine and the intention to
describe something happening in that world).28
Now suppose that we find ourselves transported to the Argon
world and that we have figured out how that world works so that we
can understand what an inhabitant of that world means when he or
she says, "My car ran out of gas." But suppose we nonetheless assert
that the phrase, "My car ran out of gas," has to mean what it usually
means in our usual world - that is, what earthlings would identify as
27. Id.
28. The speech act philosopher of language, John R. Searle, has written extensively
about how context (what he calls "the background") is essential to meaning. See JOHN R.
SEARLE, INTENTIONALITY: AN ESSAY IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (1983).
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its "literal" meaning. We would then be insisting on understanding
the sentence in its "literal" sense rather than in the sense we actually
understand the speaker to be intending. As an approach to
interpretation, taking such a position would entail both understanding
the apparent intention of the speaker and rejecting that intention in
favor of another, possible, meaning (based ultimately on how we
reasonably would understand the words if they were uttered in
another context). But as Knapp and Michaels explained, such a
position is an interpretive absurdity: "We have tried hard to find, or
when we couldn't find it, to invent, a reason why someone might insist
that a text be read as meaning what it means in the language in which
its author wrote it, even while at the same time insisting that it doesn't
matter what the author intended., 29 According to this analysis, it
would be a fundamental interpretive blunder to purport to
understand the meaning of a speaker's utterance while
simultaneously ignoring the speaker's intent.
As detailed below, the United States Supreme Court in Davis v.
United States committed precisely the interpretive blunder Knapp and
Michaels warned against. Davis suggests that the only way for a court
to engage in an "objective inquiry" into the meaning of a suspect's
utterance is to ignore the "subjective" intent of the suspect. Davis
held, specifically, that in evaluating a putative invocation of the right
to counsel courts should employ an "objective" standard of meaning
- namely, the court must determine that the suspect "articulate[d]
his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the
statement to be a request for an attorney."' "If the statement fails to
meet the requisite level of clarity," the officer can treat it as
ambiguous and can continue questioning.3 The Court acknowledges
that this standard allows suspects' statements to be disregarded as an
invocation of the right to counsel in cases where suspects do "not
clearly articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to
have a lawyer present."32
As will be discussed below, the interpretive standard mandated
by Davis contains several fundamental theoretical flaws of the sort
previously identified by deconstruction theory in the literary context.
29. See Steven Knapp & Walter Benn Michaels, Reply to John Searle, 25 NEW
LITERARY HIST. 669, 671 (1994).
30. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459.
31. Id.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
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Most fundamentally, Davis creates a standard of meaning that allows
the actual intentions of the actual speaker to be ignored, in favor of
what those words could be construed to mean by some other speaker,
in some other context. As discussed above, when it comes to
determining the meaning of a speaker's statement, the intent of the
speaker is anything but irrelevant. Consideration of the intent of the
speaker is inseparable from the determination of the meaning of an
utterance. The determination of a speaker's meaning always involves
a consideration of the speaker's intention, because a hearer always
places an utterance in context when determining an utterance's
meaning, and the concepts of context and speaker intention are
analytically inseparable. As will be discussed in detail below, by
propounding a standard of "clear articulation" that allows actual
intent of the speaker to be ignored, the Davis court has created a
standard of interpretation that actually undermines "objective"
interpretation. Davis creates, in fact, a standard that allows a court to
engage in arbitrary interpretation.
Section 3: The Evolution of Miranda Doctrine on Invocation of
the Right to Counsel
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[n]o person shall.., be compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. ,3. In 1966, the United
States Supreme Court, in one of Chief Justice Earl Warren's most
famous and controversial opinions, held that statements obtained
from criminal defendants during incommunicado interrogation in a
police-dominated atmosphere, without full advisement of relevant
constitutional rights, are inadmissible as evidence, as having been
obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-
incrimination.34 Among the procedural safeguards Miranda accorded
a person in custody is "the right to refrain from answering any further
inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney and thereafter
consents to be questioned."35 Indeed, if a person in custody "indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
35. Id. at 445.
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he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question
him."36
Miranda itself did not address the level of clarity required of a
person in custody when expressing a desire to consult counsel. The
question may arise whenever the communication is ambiguous, that
is, when the suspect makes a reference to an attorney, but it is unclear
whether the reference expresses the desire to consult an attorney
prior to further questioning. In Miranda's own terms, does such a
communication "indicate[] in any manner" that the person in custody
wishes to remain silent absent counsel, such that "the police may not
question him"? Or does ambiguity in the communication render it an
insufficient indication of the person's wishes to trigger constitutional
protection?
The high court addressed aspects of the problem in several cases
preceding Davis, showing an increasing willingness to treat textual
ambiguity as grounds for flexibility in-Miranda's application. In 1975,
Justice Stewart wrote for the court in Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), that admissibility under Miranda of statements obtained after
a person in custody has invoked his right to silence depends, not on
whether counsel was actually present for any subsequent questioning
but, rather, on whether his right to cut off questioning was
"scrupulously honored." Purporting to preserve an arrestee's right to
"control the time at which questioning occurs, the subjects discussed,
and the duration of the interrogation," the high court nevertheless
admitted a murder confession obtained in response to police
questioning in the absence of counsel two hours after the defendant
- who had been arrested and questioned on an unrelated robbery
charge - invoked his right to silence following Miranda warnings."
A review of the circumstances leading to the defendant's confession,
the court reasoned, revealed that "his 'right to cut off questioning'
was fully respected in this case."'38
36. Id. at 444-45.
37. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96,103-104 (1975).
38. Id. at 104-05. "Before his initial interrogation, Mosley was carefully advised that
he was under no obligation to answer any questions and could remain silent if he wished.
He orally acknowledged that he understood the Miranda warnings and then signed a
printed notification-of-rights form. When Mosley stated that he did not want to discuss the
robberies, Detective Cowie immediately ceased the interrogation and did not try either to
resume the questioning or in any way to persuade Mosley to reconsider his position. After
an interval of more than two hours, Mosley was questioned by another police officer at
another location about an unrelated holdup murder. He was given full and complete
Miranda warnings at the outset of the second interrogation. He was thus reminded again
that he could remain silent and could consult with a lawyer, and was carefully given a full
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In North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979), the high court
held that an explicit waiver is not necessary to support a finding that a
defendant has waived his Miranda rights. "An express written or oral
statement of waiver of the right to remain silent or of the right to
counsel is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not
inevitably either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The
question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in fact
knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated in the
Miranda case."39  Confusingly intoning that "mere silence is not
enough,"'4 the court simultaneously held that in "at least some cases
waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the
person interrogated"41 - implying that verbal silence respecting
waiver of counsel is no bar, at any rate, to its being inferred.' 2
Two years later, in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) -
the case most commonly treated by commentators as setting the
analytical stage for Davis - the high court seemed decisively to limit
the inferential opportunities afforded police interrogators based on a
suspect's ambiguous statement." In Edwards, the high court held
that, where a defendant has invoked his right to have counsel present
during custodial interrogation, subsequent waiver of the right is not
established solely by his thereafter responding to police-initiated
interrogation (even if he is again advised of his Miranda rights). "We
further hold that an accused,... having expressed his desire to deal
and fair opportunity to exercise these options." Ibid.
39. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979).
40. Id. (italics added). The court also had "said that the right to counsel does not
depend upon a request by the defendant." Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 404 (1977).
Thus, in Brewer, the court found Miranda violated when police transporting a defendant
against whom judicial proceedings had begun agreed with his attorney not to interrogate
him but then made statements during the trip designed to elicit information. Id.
41. Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
42. At trial, one of the questioning agents testified that the defendant "said nothing
when advised of his right to the assistance of a lawyer." Id. at 377. But the high court
nevertheless allowed the waiver inference based on the defendant's other "words and
actions." Specifically, the court noted: "the agents then took the respondent to the FBI
office in nearby New Rochelle, N. Y. There, after the agents determined that the
respondent had an 11th grade education and was literate, he was given the Bureau's
'Advice of Rights' form which he read. When asked if he understood his rights, he replied
that he did. The respondent refused to sign the waiver at the bottom of the form. He was
told that he need neither speak nor sign the form, but that the agents would like him to
talk to them. The respondent replied: 'I will talk to you but I am not signing any form.'
He then made inculpatory statements." Id. at 370-71.
43. See also, Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986); ("Doubts must be
resolved in favor of protecting the constitutional claim" so "we presume that the
defendant requests the lawyer's services at every critical stage of the prosecution."). Id.
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with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further
interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available
to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication,
exchanges, or conversations with the police."'
Subsequent pronouncements, however, made clear that
Edwards' protective treatment of custodial reticence would not
necessarily inhibit police interrogators from creatively interpreting
suspects' statements as communicative openings to further
questioning." When the high court held only three years after
Edwards, in Smith v. Illinois, that all questioning must cease "[w]here
nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up
to the request would render it ambiguous,"46 its holding opened up
the possibility of a significant contrary proposition, namely that an
ambiguous request would not require the cessation of questioning.
But while the court acknowledged the issue, noting that "[o]n
occasion, an accused's asserted request for counsel may be ambiguous
or equivocal, 4 7 it expressly declined to choose among the "conflicting
standards for determining the consequences of such ambiguities" that
48it saw developing in the lower courts.
Three years later, in Connecticut v. Barrett, the court held that
there was no Miranda violation when oral statements are used against
a suspect who refused to make written statements without the
presence of his attorney.49 The defendant in Barrett, after refusing to
make written statements, then went on to make oral statements to the
police without his attorney being present. ° On appeal, the defendant
argued that the Miranda issue should be decided in light of the court's
previous pronouncements that a defendant's request for counsel must
be interpreted broadly.5  The high court was of the view that
interpretive problems were not presented, however, stating, "Barrett
44. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,484-85 (1981).
45. See, e.g., Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality opinion),
wherein the court held that, in asking, "Well, what is going to happen to me now?," the
accused had initiated further conversation for purpose of the Edwards rule.
46. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 98 (1984).
47. Id. at 95.
48. Id.
49. Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 530, n.3 (1987).
50. Id. at 529. Upon arrival at the police station, an officer advised the defendant of
his rights and he signed a Miranda acknowledgment. Thereafter, "he would not give the
police any written statements but he had no problem in talking about the incident." Id. at
525.
51. Id. at 529.
made clear his intentions, and they were honored by the police."52
Interpretation, the court said, "is only required where the defendant's
words, understood as ordinary people would understand them, are
ambiguous."53
It was not until it decided Davis, seven years later, that the court
directly considered the legal effect of a suspect's ambiguous
utterance. And the standard of meaning the court articulated in
Davis changed from that it previously had articulated - from "words,
understood as ordinary people would understand them '"- to words
that were required to meet a "requisite level of clarity."55 This change
creates significant consequences for the constitutional standard of
meaning that courts must apply today.
Section 4: The Holding of Davis v. United States
As shown in the previous section, although Miranda states that
the right to counsel is triggered whenever a person in custody
"indicates in any manner... that he wishes to consult with an
attorney," the high court in subsequent cases has oscillated in how
liberally it construes detainees' utterances. As discussed above, Smith
v. Illinois and Connecticut v. Barrett implied that only an
unambiguous statement would count as a valid invocation of the
counsel right. Having thus painted itself into a corner (by making the
issue of ambiguity central) the court in Davis attempted to formulate
a bright line solution to the resulting problem. Regrettably, the court
pronounced a standard of meaning that is theoretically contradictory
and so, ironically, encourages courts to engage in arbitrary acts of
interpretation.
The underlying facts of Davis can be briefly summarized. Robert
L. Davis, a Navy seaman, spent the evening of October 2, 1988,
shooting pool at a club on his base. Another sailor, Keith Shackleton,
lost a game (and a $30 wager) to Davis, but refused to pay the
gambling debt. After the club closed, Shackleton was beaten to death
with a pool cue on a loading dock behind the commissary; the body
was found the next morning. The Naval Investigative Service (NIS)
gradually focused its investigation on Davis. On November 4, 1998,
Davis was interviewed at the NIS office. As required by military law,
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994).
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the agents advised Davis that he was not required to make a
statement, that any statement could be used against him at a trial by
court-martial, and that he was entitled to speak with an attorney and
have an attorney present during questioning. Davis waived his rights
to remain silent and to counsel, both orally and in writing.
Approximately an hour and a half into the interview, Davis said,
"Maybe I should talk to a lawyer." The interviewing agents indicated
they would not continue questioning Davis unless he clarified
whether he was asking for a lawyer or was just making a comment.
Davis said, "No, I'm not asking for a lawyer," and then added, "No, I
don't want a lawyer." After a short break, the agents reminded Davis
of his rights to remain silent and to counsel. The interview then
continued for another hour, until Davis said, "I think I want a lawyer
before I say anything else." At that point, questioning ceased.56
At his general court-martial, Davis moved to suppress statements
made during the interview of November 4. The Military Judge
denied Davis' motion, holding that "the mention of a lawyer by
[Davis] during the course of the interrogation [was] not in the form of
a request for council and ... the agents properly determined that [he]
was not indicating a desire for or invoking his right to counsel."
Davis was convicted on one specification of unpremeditated murder,
in violation of Article 118 of the United States Code of Military
Justice. The United States Court of Military Appeals granted
discretionary review and affirmed. The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to address questions about the varying approaches
being approved in the lower courts with respect to ambiguous or
equivocal references to counsel during custodial interrogation. "
As discussed, lower federal courts had prior to Davis adopted
varying approaches, in the context of ambiguous or equivocal
references, to Edwards' requirement that questioning must cease
upon a suspect's invocation of the right to counsel. The primary
approaches being taken were: (1) all questioning should stop and not
resume until a lawyer is present (that is, treating an ambiguous or
equivocal request identically to a non-ambiguous or non-equivocal
request); (2) all questioning except that necessary to clarify a
suspect's intention should cease until it is clarified that the suspect
does not intend to invoke his counsel right; and (3) general
questioning may continue, on the ground that officers had no duty to
clarify a suspect's intended meaning. When Davis was interrogated,
56. Id. at 454-55.
57. Id. at 455-56.
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the NIS officers involved had followed procedure (2) - thus, after
Davis made an ambiguous reference to counsel, the officers
questioned him as to his intent until he clarified that he was not, in
fact, asking for a lawyer. The court ultimately found no constitutional
error had been committed in the course of Davis' interrogation, thus
impliedly validating approach (2) as constitutional. But the high
court in its opinion went further, taking the occasion to state that
approach (3) also is constitutional - with the consequence that, not
only may police questioning continue after a suspect ambiguously
references his counsel rights, but questioning officers have no
constitutional obligation under such circumstances to clarify the
suspect's intention.
Thus, Davis held: "[I]f a suspect makes a reference to an attorney
that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of
the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might
be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the
cessation of questioning.... Rather, the suspect must unambiguously
request counsel. 58 This holding in turn rests on the high court's
selection of an interpretive standard of meaning by which
interrogating officers (and reviewing courts) are to distinguish
ambiguous from unambiguous requests. The court states this
standard to be: "Although a suspect need not 'speak with the
discrimination of an Oxford don' ... he must articulate his desire to
have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police
officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a
request for an attorney.""
Justice Souter along with three other concurring justices wrote
separately to urge that due process, contrary to the majority's
implication, requires officers to clarify a suspect's intention when the
suspect refers ambiguously or equivocally to his counsel rights during
custodial interrogation. Justice Souter emphasized general principles
that had guided Miranda jurisprudence for the preceding thirty years,
including, most importantly, consideration of the realities of the
interrogation process. As Justice Souter noted, "awareness of just
these realities has, in the past, dissuaded the court from placing any
burden of clarity upon individuals in custody, but has led it instead to
require that requests for counsel be "given a broad, rather than a
narrow, interpretation. '"" Numerous commentators have followed
58. Id. at 459.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 470 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Justice Souter's lead in criticizing the Davis majority's approach.61
What has not been closely scrutinized, however, is the way in which
the key formulations of the Davis majority's posited standard of
meaning are revealed, upon close analysis, to be contradictory.
Certain insights available from the debates in literary criticism
previously described readily illuminate these problems.
Section 5: Contradiction in the Davis Standard of Meaning
Proceeding similarly to those literary critics who sought to
provide a theoretical method for the "correct" interpretation of a
literary text, the Davis majority sought to mandate an "objective
inquiry" into whether a suspect's reference to an attorney should be
interpreted as an invocation of the right to counsel under the Miranda
doctrine.62 Davis held that "[i]f the statement fails to meet the
requisite level of clarity," the officer can treat it as ambiguous and can
continue questioning.63 The court acknowledged that this standard
allows suspects' statements to be disregarded as an invocation of the
right to counsel in cases where suspects do "not clearly articulate
61. See, e.g., Wayne Holly, Ambiguous Invocations of the Right To Remain Silent: A
Post-Davis Analysis and Proposal, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 558, 591 (1998) (noting social
science "has confirmed the debilitating effect that the interrogation atmosphere can have
on many suspects' ability to assert themselves linguistically"); Anthony McDermott and
H. Caldwell, Did He or Didn't He? The Effect of Dickerson on the Post-Waiver Invocation
Equation, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 863, 927 (2001) (arguing "Miranda's premise is a recognition
of the compulsion inherent in custodial interrogation in the state's attempt to subjugate
the individual to its will, and thus any efforts, even equivocal ones, to invoke the very
protections designed to assist the individual in such circumstances should be recognized");
Samira Sadeghi, Hung Up on Semantics: A Critique of Davis v. United States, 23
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 313, 343-346 (1995) (arguing that to burden individuals in custody
with a clarity obligation invites police manipulation in evasion of Edwards); Harvey Gee,
Essay: When Do You Have To Be Clear?: Reconsidering Davis v. United States, 30 Sw. U.
L. REV. 381, 382 (2001) (arguing Davis "marks a departure from the Fifth Amendment's
requirement that the government bear the entire burden of protecting an individual's
privilege against self-incrimination); Peter Tiersma and Lawrence Solan, Cops and
Robbers: Selective Literalism in American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 229, 250
(2004) ("People in custody may feel uncomfortable making a direct request or a demand
for a lawyer to someone in a position of power over them. Instead, they are naturally
inclined by the situation to be polite or deferential, and therefore make any requests
indirectly, perhaps by using expressions of need or desire, or by making the request in the
form of a question, or by adding a condition"). But see Timothy Yuncker, Davis v. United
States. The Unambiguous Decline of Ambiguous Requests for Counsel During Custodial
Interrogation, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 711, 742 (1995) (arguing police officers "should not
be responsible for delving into the subjective intent of a suspect who haphazardly
mentions counsel during custodial interrogation").
62. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
63. Id.
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their right to counsel although they actually want to have a lawyer
present.' 6" Thus the Davis court asserts that an "objective inquiry"
into the meaning of a suspect's utterance allows a court to disregard
the subjective intent of the suspect, and instead requires that the
suspect "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney."65 But, as
has been shown through the linguistic analyses of Hirsch,66 and Knapp
and Michaels,67 it is a theoretical contradiction to ignore the intent of
a speaker in favor of some purportedly "objective" standard of
meaning. To find any sort of meaning whatsoever in an utterance,
every interpreter implicitly provides a context and a hypothetical
speaker's intent. As discussed above, the interpretive choice is not
between subjective intent and objective meaning but, rather, is always
between different hypothetical intents.
As Justice Souter emphasized in his concurrence, Davis places a
"burden of clarity upon individuals in custody."'  Subsequent legal
commentators have pointed out Davis' basic unfairness in demanding
that all individuals in custody meet the same standard of linguistic
clarity, noting that some individuals are, by virtue of their education
or socio-economic background, incapable of meeting such a
standard.6 9 The related point, which also has been raised by several
64. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 459.
66. Supra note 18.
67. Supra note 26.
68. Id. at 470 (Souter, J., concurring).
69. "Research by linguists over the past two or three decades has shown that an
indirect speech style and greater use of hedging tends to be associated with people of
lower socioeconomic status." (Peter Tiersma and Lawrence Solan, Cops and Robbers:
Selective Literalism in American Criminal Law, 38 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 229, 253 (2004).)
"Thus, a rule requiring detainees to invoke their right to counsel with clarity leads
disproportionately to people with less education and socioeconomic clout having to
navigate through police interrogations without a lawyer." Id. at 254. In particular
commentators have correctly noted that the actual linguistic practices of many women and
minorities preclude them from meeting the standard of clarity demanded by Davis. See,
e.g., Alexa Young, When Is A Request A Request?: Inadequate Constitutional Protection
for Women In Police Interrogations, 51 FLA. L. REV. 143, 145 (1999) (analyzing Davis'
threshold of clarity standard "through feminist legal methods to reveal the gender bias in a
seemingly gender-neutral legal doctrine"); Samira Sadeghi, Hung Up on Semantics: A
Critique of Davis v. United States, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 317, 330-35 (1995) (arguing
Davis ignores cultural and sociological differences, with the consequence that "certain
groups, including women and ethnic minorities, will feel the brunt of the decision to adopt
the threshold-of-clarity approach"); Tom Chen, Davis v. United States: "Maybe I Should
Talk to a Lawyer" Means Maybe Miranda is Unraveling, 23 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 607, 643
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commentators, is how will a standard of clarity for custodial suspects
be defined? ° The Davis majority somewhat sarcastically quotes
(1996) (arguing Davis "would mainly affect the rights of two main groups of individuals:
those that do not have the communication skills to adequately make an unambiguous
request for counsel and those who are so intimidated by the police that they do not or
cannot make an unambiguous request"). Even Davis' defenders acknowledge the point.
See, Timothy Yuncker, Davis v. United States: The Unambiguous Decline of Ambiguous
Requests for Counsel During Custodial Interrogation, 4 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 711, 745 &
n.184 (1995) (expressly not attempting "to counter the empirical data that established that
some females and minorities speak in a less assertive manner than do most white males");
Adam Finger, How Do You Get A Lawyer Around Here? The Ambiguous Invocation of a
Defendant's Right to Counsel Under Miranda v. Arizona, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 1041, 1063
(1996) (arguing "the clarification standard is the only process that adequately recognizes
the cultural diversity of American society while allowing effective law enforcement").
Other areas of the law present analogous issues surrounding the setting of objective
standards for an individual's conduct, for example, the objective "reasonable person"
standard prescribed by tort law. Just as the law of negligence judges tortious acts by an
objective standard of care, and states in effect: We do not care what you meant to do, we
will still hold you liable for the consequences of your acts according to an objective
standard of care; Davis says, in effect: We do not care what you meant to say; we will
interpret the meaning of your words by an objective standard of clarity. Notwithstanding
the fact that individuals vary widely in their intelligence and other qualities bearing on the
ability to act prudently, all are held legally liable for meeting the same standard of care.
See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 283 ("Conduct Of A Reasonable Man: The
Standard") ("Unless the actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must
conform to avoid being negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances...
Negligence is a departure from a standard of conduct demanded by the community for the
protection of others against unreasonable risk. The standard which the community
demands must be an objective and external one, rather than that of the individual
judgment, good or bad, of the particular individual.").
70. See, e.g., Eugenia Guiffreda, Davis v. United States: Speak Clearly or Lose Your
Right To Counsel, 6 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 405, 418 (arguing "the [Davis]
court's failure to set forth objective criteria allows lower courts to develop different
thresholds of clarity" and that, as a result, "similarly situated defendants will be treated
differently depending upon what jurisdiction they are in"); Harvey Gee, Essay: When Do
You Have To Be Clear?: Reconsidering Davis v. United States, 30 SW. U. L. REV. 381, 386-
389 (2001) (arguing post-Miranda decisions "have impaired Miranda's original clarity,
making it difficult for the police and lower courts to determine the circumstances under
which confessions may be obtained" and that the result "is not merely confusion, but a
tacit encouragement of police overreaching and judicial circumvention"); Alexa Young,
When Is A Request A Request?: Inadequate Constitutional Protection for Women In Police
Interrogations, 51 FLA. L. REV. 143, 159 (1999) ("The threshold of clarity standard allows
officers to guess whether the suspect wants an attorney and if she has articulated clearly
enough to require one, which results in 'difficult judgment calls"'); Jane Faulkner, So You
Kinda, Sorta, Think You Might Need A Lawyer? Ambiguous Requests For Counsel After
Davis v. United States, 49 ARK. L. REV. 275, 302 (warning that "courts may engage in a
comparison of Davis's statement with the statements made in subsequent cases, paying
particular attention to the use of hedge words"); William Worobec, Designing A "System
For Idiots": An Analysis of the Impracticality of Davis v. United States on Ambiguous
Waivers of the Right to the Presence of Counsel, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 239, 281 (surveying
courts' application of Davis and concluding that "the Davis decision has done little if not
nothing to solve the question of equivocal waivers of the right to counsel" partly because
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Justice Souter's "Oxford don" phrase to define its standard in terms
of what will not be required - namely, that "a suspect need not
'speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don.' 71 But even if one
sets aside this mythical exemplar of linguistic clarity, there remains
considerable uncertainly as to what the actual standard amounts to.
As the linguistic analysis of Tiersma and Solan has shown, the
issue as presented in police interrogation cases is usually not clarity of
expression but, rather, bluntness. In treating verbal equivocation as
ambiguity, the Davis majority suggests a suspect has not invoked his
right to counsel unless he has intoned it verbatim - "I hereby demand
my right to speak to a lawyer forthwith." But this is the sort of
formulistic statement no actual person other than a lawyer would ever
utter. In ordinary life, of course, statements of desire are considered
perfectly clear even when they are much less blunt. What the Davis
majority takes as equivocation in a phrase like, "Maybe I should talk to
a lawyer," viewed in terms of actual linguistic practice, may in reality
simply reflect the way ordinary people are inclined to express requests,
particularly requests directed to persons in authority.73
Critics of the Davis majority from Justice Souter onwards have
pointed out the unfairness of the amorphous less-than-an-Oxford-don
burden of clarity now demanded of suspects. We want to take the
critique a step further and consider a theoretical contradiction
inherent in the Davis interpretive standard not directly addressed by
the previous commentary. It is a contradiction for a listener to say to
a speaker: "I understand, from what you have just said, that you
actually want to have a lawyer present; however, what you have said
does not count as request for counsel, because you have not clearly
articulated the request." As the above analysis has shown, if the
listener understands the speaker's intent to communicate a meaning,
then that is the meaning of the utterance. It is irrelevant that the
same request could be made in another way, which might, by some
standard, be considered more "clearly" articulated. But Davis makes
it possible for a court to rule a suspect's request "ambiguous" (and
thus disqualify it as an invocation of the right to counsel) on precisely
this contradictory basis.
The Davis court acknowledges it is allowing a distinction
questions "still exist such as what exactly an equivocal statement is").
71. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
72. See, Tiersma & Solan, Cops and Robbers: Selective Literalism in American
Criminal Law, 38 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 229, 239-241.
73. Id.
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between a custodial suspect's intention and his or her words when it
states "that requiring a clear assertion of the right to counsel might
disadvantage some suspects who - because of fear, intimidation, lack
of linguistic skills, or a variety of other reasons - will not clearly
articulate their right to counsel although they actually want to have a
lawyer present."7  Proceeding under the intentionalist analysis
articulated by Hirsch,75 and by Knapp and Michaels,76 however, when
an interrogator perceives the speaker's intent is in fact to
communicate a desire to have a lawyer present, then that is the
meaning the interrogator should assign to the speaker's utterance.
And that, we would argue, is also the meaning that a reviewing court
should charge the interrogator with having understood.
It is true that certain forms of expressing a desire to have a
lawyer present like, "Maybe I should have a lawyer," might properly
in certain contexts be interpreted as not actually being requests - as,
for example, where someone not in a custodial interrogation makes
the comment while talking to a friend about the issue of estate
planning. But the point is, the meaning of the utterance must be
defined by the context of the actual utterance. Davis states that the
suspect must "articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently
clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would
understand the statement to be a request for an attorney." 77 But, as
discussed above, a listener's consideration of the "circumstances" of a
speaker's utterance necessarily entails consideration of the speaker's
intention. And Davis allows the speaker's intention to be ignored as
one of the circumstances a court may consider.
A defender of Davis might argue that Davis is only seeking to
preclude consideration of the unspoken, and thus unknown,
intentions of a speaker in determining whether or not a suspect has
invoked his right to counsel. Neither a police officer, nor a reviewing
court, after all, can be expected to take on the role of psychoanalyst
and search for a suspect's secret, innermost wishes and desires for
counsel, if the suspect fails to express those desires. This is a perfectly
valid point, but neither we nor any other critic of Davis has ever
suggested that a completely private and unexpressed subjective
intention of a suspect can be the basis for the invocation of the right
to counsel. The purported intention of a suspect only becomes a legal
74. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460.
75. Supra note 18.
76. Supra note 26.
77. Id. at 459.
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issue when the suspect manifests that intention in some public way.
Plainly, the only means by which a criminal suspect's subjective
intention becomes known (whether to police, in the course of
interrogation, or to a reviewing court, examining the record on
appeal) is through objective signs: through actions and circumstances
that are held to the usual legal standards of evidentiary verification,
and through written, recorded, or described words.78
The problem is that the Davis standard goes much further than
allowing reviewing courts to excuse police for ignoring a suspect's
unexpressed intention. As discussed above, by putting a burden of
"clarity" of expression on the speaker, Davis allows interrogators to
ignore expressed intention as well. Of course it is possible to argue in
defense of Davis that an unclearly expressed request for counsel
should be treated the same as an unexpressed one: that police cannot
reasonably be expected to determine a suspect's intention when it is
not expressed clearly. After all, why should a special burden be
placed on the police officers to puzzle out the speaker's intention in
order to understand what a suspect means by his or her words?
As the theorists reviewed above have demonstrated, the answer
to this objection is that it is not a special burden on a hearer to
consider the intent of the speaker when determining the meaning of
his or her words; rather, it is normal interpretive practice. As
discussed above, the only interpretive alternative to considering a
speaker's intention is to proceed as if the spoken words have meaning
independent of that intention. The Davis court implicitly adopts this
position in mandating a purely "objective inquiry" into the meaning
of suspect's utterances concerning counsel. Indeed, the Davis court
asserts that "an objective inquiry" "avoids difficulties of proof" and
"provide[s] guidance to officers conducting investigations." 79
As authority for its emphasis on objectivity, the high court in
Davis cited Connecticut v. Barrett.' But Barrett nowhere uses the
term "objective inquiry." At the citation given in the Davis opinion,
Barrett states only that: "Interpretation is only required where the
defendant's words, understood as ordinary people would understand
them, are ambiguous."8' Indeed, we would agree that a search for
78. "Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel 'requires, at a minimum, some
statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the
assistance of an attorney."' Id., citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 178 (1991).
79. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
80. Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529.
81. Id.
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"objectivity" when inquiring into a suspect's purported invocation of
the right to counsel is perfectly compatible with normal interpretive
practice - in the words of Barrett itself, with the way "ordinary
people" would "understand" words. But as discussed above, the way
that "ordinary people" understand words is by considering the
circumstances in which they are spoken, which necessarily includes a
consideration of the speaker's intention.
By stating that a speaker's intention is necessarily always part of
a listener's consideration of the circumstances of the utterance, we are
not claiming that the listener's hypothesis of the speaker's intention
will always correspond to what that speaker may later claim was his
or her actual intention in speaking. There will always be situations in
which the listener reasonably misunderstands what the speaker is
trying to say. Sometimes there will be no useful evidence concerning
the circumstances of the utterance that can cast additional light on the
speaker's intention. In such instances, interrogating police and
reviewing courts presumably are justified in applying a "literal"
interpretation of the suspect's statement (which should still be
understood, as discussed, as a hypothesis about intention - but one
that has been applied to such words so often that it has become, in
effect, the "default" hypothesis about the intention such words
convey). Consonant with the intentionalist position discussed above,
of course, a court really is applying such a default hypothesis about
intention when it purports to consider a suspect's statement "on its
face."
Often, however, there will exist useful evidence indicating that,
in the particular circumstances, a defendant's words should have been
understood in a "non-literal" way - that is, evidence indicating the
speaker's intention was to communicate a request for counsel in a
"non-literal" manner. There appears no reason why courts should
not be free to consider such evidence, or even required to consider it.
Indeed, part of the Davis holding appears to direct courts to consider
evidence of this nature, in that Davis states its interpretive standard in
terms of what "a reasonable police officer in the circumstances" would
understand. Presumably, relevant circumstantial evidence will
include any special evidence that bears on the speaker's intention. 3
82. See People v. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d 98, 106 (2005). Gonzalez, a recent California
Supreme Court decision based on Davis, will be discussed in detail in the next section.
83. An instructive but unlikely example would be if a suspect were to say at the
beginning of his custodial interrogation, "If I say "knock knock, buzz, buzz" during the
course of this interrogation that means that I am hereby invoking my right to counsel
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But Davis tends, both theoretically and practically, to nullify the
"under the circumstances" part of its holding in simultaneously
requiring that the custodial suspect "articulate his desire to have
counsel present" according to an unspecified level of "requisite
clarity." As has been explained, one unfortunate consequence of the
"requisite clarity" locution is that reviewing courts may regard
themselves as free (or even required) to examine a defendant's
statement "on its face," and to make a determination of the suspect's
meaning based solely on "literal" meaning, even when there exists
relevant evidence indicating a custodial suspect's words should have
been understood by interrogating police in a non-literal way.
Thus, in terms of the intentionalist position earlier discussed, the
"requisite clarity" part of Davis' holding makes it possible for police,
and courts reviewing their conduct under Miranda, to ignore relevant
evidence respecting a custodial suspect's intention when he or she
makes an ambiguous reference to the presence of counsel.8' As
Hirsch in particular pointed out, when words are considered merely
as strings of possible meanings, interpretation takes place more or
less at the whim of the interpreter - who is free to pick and choose
between possible meanings. In the context of legal interpretation,
such freedom may encourage courts in particular cases to select
meanings with a view to generating (more or less consciously) desired
outcomes.85 As will be discussed next, one legacy of Davis has been
to provide an interpretive standard that allows reviewing courts
broad, if not unlimited, latitude to find a suspect's utterance
under Miranda. Later during the interrogation, the suspect does say "knock knock, buzz,
buzz." Would it not then be reasonable for the officer under the circumstances to treat
the phrase, "knock knock, buzz, buzz," as being a request for counsel? Whereas, without
this extremely unlikely background circumstance, it would be manifestly unreasonable to
treat the phrase "knock knock, buzz, buzz," as a request for counsel.
84. It 'is important to note that the Davis majority never even went through the
motions of actually applying the new standard of meaning announced in that case. The
majority never explained, that is, why Davis' statement did not convey his desire to have
counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would
have understood him. Rather, when the high court turned to consider Davis' statement, it
simply deferred to the interpretations of the courts below: "The courts below found that
petitioner's remarks to the NIS agents - 'Maybe I should talk to a lawyer' - was not a
request for counsel, and we see no reason to disturb that conclusion." Davis, 512 U.S. at
462.
85. As Tiersma and Solan point out, this appears to be the actual practice of many
courts, which routinely ignore common linguistic practice in order to adopt hyper-literal
interpretations of criminal defendants' requests, when it suits the result a court wants. See
Tiersma & Solan, supra note 72, at p. 247 ("It is hard to avoid the impression that courts
are significantly more likely to take pragmatic information into account when it benefits
the government, and less so when it helps the accused.").
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ambiguous, and thus to find that the utterance is not an invocation of
the right to counsel.
Section 6: The Continuing Legacy of Davis
The Davis decision continues to dictate that courts apply an
artificial approach when interpreting a criminal defendant's alleged
invocation of the right to counsel. This can be seen in a recent
decision, People v. Gonzalez, in which the Supreme Court of
California reviewed the first degree murder conviction of a Los
Angeles gang member for shooting a police officer.' The defendant
in Gonzalez was being interviewed by a police after having waived his
right to remain silent. Asked whether he would be willing to take a
lie detector test, the defendant agreed. Specifically, the interviewing
detective asked, "You're willing to do it?" and the defendant replied,
"That um, one thing I want to ask you to that, if for anything you guys
are going to charge me I want to talk to a public defender too, for any
little thing." Defendant eventually went on to confess shooting a
police officer.
At trial, the defendant moved to exclude his confession on the
ground (among others) that the police had not adequately honored
his invocation of the right to counsel. The trial court denied the
motion, but the Court of Appeal reversed the murder conviction on
this ground.8 The Supreme Court, in turn, reversed the Court of
Appeal, holding that, under the Davis standard, "defendant's
statement was ambiguous and equivocal" and therefore did not
constitute a valid invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to
counsel.89
Under Davis, the question for the state high court in Gonzalez
was, of course, whether, in light of the circumstances, a reasonable
police officer would have understood the defendant's reference to an
attorney ("I want to talk to a public defender") to be an unequivocal
and unambiguous request for counsel. 9° As defendant's reference was
by its terms conditional ("if for any thing you guys are going to charge
me.. ."), answering that question required the court to decide what
the police officers interrogating the defendant could reasonably have
86. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d 98.
87. Id. at 102.
88. People v. Gonzalez, No. B154557; 2003 WL 22977531 (Cal. Ct. App.) (rev.
granted Mar. 24, 2004).
89. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d at 100.
90. Davis, 512 U.S. at 460-62.
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understood him to mean by the word, "charge." The lower appellate
court, in reversing defendant's conviction, had concluded that his
custodial references to a public defender constituted "a sufficiently
clear articulation of a desire to speak to counsel" even prior to formal
charging because this court saw no basis for concluding defendant
meant to draw a "distinction between booking and charging."9
Defendant, in his briefing to the state high court, had argued that
"charged" includes "booked" and that the detectives interviewing
him should reasonably have understood that."
Under Davis, if a reasonable police officer in the circumstances
would have understood the defendant to have meant "charged" to
include being booked, and the police were indeed planning to book
him, his invocation of counsel arguably was one the police were
required immediately to acknowledge and act upon." At trial, how-
ever, the interviewing detectives had testified they understood the
defendant to mean he wanted to have the services of a public
defender only if he was charged with a crime.94 Since the literal
denotation of "charge" is the formal filing of charges by the District
Attorney, the defendant's reference to counsel arguably was a
conditional request for counsel in the event of a possible future
occurrence over which the police had no control (since prosecutors,
not police, are responsible for charging decisions). Pursuant to this
analysis, the police reasonably understood defendant to be saying
that, if and when the District Attorney charged him with a crime, he
wanted to consult an attorney.
The Supreme Court of California accepted this analysis. The
court held: "On its face, defendant's statement was conditional; he
wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged. The conditional
nature of the statement rendered it, at best, ambiguous and equivocal
because a reasonable police officer in these circumstances would not
necessarily have known whether the condition would be fulfilled
since, as these officers explained, the decision to charge is not made
by police. Confronted with this statement, a reasonable officer would
have understood only that 'the suspect might be invoking his right to
counsel,' which is insufficient under Davis to require cessation of
questioning. '" 95
91. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d at 106.
92. Id. at 107, n. 3.
93. Davis, 512 U.S. at 459.
94. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d at 103.
95. Id. at 106.
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The Gonzalez court's reasoning is both faithful to the Davis
framework and highlights the problems with that framework. The
court states that its task under Davis is to determine what a
reasonable police officer in the circumstances would have understood
the defendant's actual statement to mean, "without regard to the
defendant's subjective ability or capacity to articulate his or her desire
for counsel, and with no further requirement imposed upon the
officers to ask clarifying questions of the defendant."96 But, as we
have explained, to enquire into what these officers reasonably could
have understood the defendant to mean by the word "charged"
necessarily is to ask what the defendant intended to communicate by
his question. This is so because, as discussed above, what the officers
understood the defendant to mean was by definition the hypothesis
they formed, in the circumstances, about his intention when uttering
the statement. Any such hypothesis necessarily is determined by the
whole context of the utterance at issue, and is never determined by
the "literal" definitions of its component words or phrases considered
in isolation. In other words, one can only decide what a reasonable
officer in these particular circumstances would have understood the
defendant to have meant by the word "charged" through analyzing
what these officers reasonably could have understood the defendant
to have intended.97
While the state high court in Gonzalez correctly followed the
Davis approach, one can observe in the court's discussion a desire to
proceed analytically beyond Davis. This desire reflects the court's
natural impulse to follow normal interpretive practice. As mentioned
above, the state high court criticizes the lower appellate court for
examining the defendant's personal background with respect to
whether he was sophisticated enough to understand the distinction
between "charging" and "booking." The court characterizes this as
focusing on the defendant's "ability to clearly articulate his desire for
counsel," a consideration which, as the court correctly notes, Davis
rejects: "[T]he detectives were not required, under Davis, to ascertain
whether, when he used the word 'charged,' the defendant actually
meant 'arrested' or 'booked,' though, in effect, they gave him the
opportunity to clarify the point when they explained to him the
96. Id.
97. The factual context in Gonzalez was sufficiently unusual that it is difficult to
imagine what implicit "default" context would determine the interpretation of a
reasonable interrogating officer.
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difference between those terms." 98
The Gonzalez court itself, however, plainly addresses an aspect
of the defendant's intention in the circumstances when it focuses on
the fact that the interviewing officers brought the distinction between
charging and booking to the defendant's attention." Strictly
according to Davis, the question of whether defendant understood
such distinctions is supposed to be irrelevant. But in actual
interpretive practice the issue is inescapable, because it goes to the
issue of what the defendant intended to say. Here, if it could be
shown that the defendant speaker understood the formal distinction
between "charging" and "booking," then any hypothesis about the
meaning of his statement based on this distinction becomes much
more plausible. The Gonzalez court seems implicitly aware of this,
and thus is drawn to address the issue, even though it is, strictly
speaking, irrelevant to the interpretive standard prescribed by Davis.
Conclusion
Although Derrida is dead, the interpretive debate his work has
provoked should live on. His work prompted crucial insights that
serious scholars of interpretation now take for granted, and that legal
interpretation cannot ignore. Among these is the simple yet crucial
insight that a given set of words may mean different things when
spoken by different speakers in different contexts. Derrida's critics
complained that his focus on the ambiguity of language would
undermine all standards for objective interpretation and thus open
the door to arbitrary interpretation. As it turns out, ignorance of the
complexities of how language determines meaning does not insure
objective interpretation. Rather, as analysis of Davis v. United States
and its legacy reveals, such ignorance perpetuates the reverse.
Ironically, while the high court in Davis sought to introduce an
"objective" standard of interpretation for custodial suspects' alleged
invocations of the right to counsel, the high court's failure to heed
some of deconstruction's fundamental teachings has engendered
interpretive confusion.
Several critics of Davis have argued that the best solution to the
problem of ambiguous invocations of the right to counsel would be to
impose a duty upon interrogating police officers to clarify a suspect's
98. Gonzalez, 104 P.3d at 107.
99. See id. at 106 (noting "the detectives responded to defendant's statement by
explaining to him the difference between being arrested and booked and being charged,
thus providing him with an opportunity to clarify his meaning...").
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intention before continuing questioning, when a suspect makes an
ambiguous reference to counsel.19 We agree, but even failing a
reversal of Davis on this point, we would argue that courts can and
should apply normal interpretive methods when determining the
meaning of a criminal suspect's purportedly "ambiguous" invocation
of the right to counsel, which necessarily includes a consideration of
the speaker's intention. The Davis standard, at best, offers no
practical guidance in this area. At worst, by setting forth a standard
of interpretation that allows meaning to be separated from the
speaker's intention, Davis distances interpretation from this essential
determiner of meaning, encouraging both police and courts to engage
in arbitrary acts of interpretation.
100. See, e.g., McDermott & Caldwell, supra note 61, at 927; Holly, supra note 61, at
581; Finger, supra note 69, at 1063; Chen, supra note 69, at 650.
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